As an initial proposition, all relevant evidence is admissible. See Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 402. In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Since then, expert testimony (subject to Rule 702) is not relevant unless it is “(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” In determining whether expert opinion assists the trier of fact, the Court should determine whether the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology can properly be applied to the facts in issue. “Rule 702 grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for its abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the particular case.” See Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
One consideration in deciding this issue is whether the scientific knowledge can be (and has been) tested. Another is whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication. Additionally, Court should consider the known or potential rate of error. The old “general acceptance” test from Frye is not the sole factor in determining admissibility, although it might have bearing and can be “an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,” Downing, 753 F. 2d, at 1238, may properly be viewed with skepticism.”
The inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is a flexible one. “‘General acceptance’ is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence— especially Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.”
Georgia generally follows the Daubert standard under it current rules of evidence (O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702). Subsection 702(f) expressly references Daubert and states that Georgia Court may rely on it, providing as follows:
It is the intent of the legislature that, in all proceedings, the courts of the State of Georgia not be viewed as open to expert evidence that would not be admissible in other states. Therefore, in interpreting and applying this Code section, the courts of this state may draw from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); and other cases in federal courts applying the standards announced by the United States Supreme Court in these cases.
In MyFamilyDoc, LLC v. Johnson, 366 Ga. App. 459 (2023), defendants appealed denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony. A patient died and the plaintiff alleged the cause was a missed diagnosis of severe anemia. Defendants argued “the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to exclude a doctor’s expert opinion that Johnston’s severe anemia was a proximate cause of his death because the doctor did not base his opinion on a proper differential diagnosis.” Essentially, Defendants argued that the expert failed to rule out other causes of death.
The Court of Appeals viewed the expert’s entire deposition in context, finding that although the deceased patient had other comorbities, the expert considered and addressed them sufficiently. Even though he agreed with the death certificate that cardiovascular disease was the immediate cause of death, “Johnston’s anemia aggravated the other underlying diseases, that his severe anemia coupled with his other comorbidities led to his death, and that he probably would not have died when he did without such severe anemia.” The expert opined that the only change from the deceased’s prior lab results was the anemia and his acute symptoms made his other conditions worse. There was no abuse of discretion admitting the testimony because Defendants failed to show that that the expert opinion was not rendered using a scientifically valid methodology.