Medicaid

Medicaid: Homeplace Exemption

Which Home is the Homeplace? Pernie Dupree entered a nursing home on September 11, 2009. Prior to her admission, she had lived with her husband at 1 Bragg Circle since 1949. The Bragg Circle property was valued at $45,411. After hs wife entered the nursing home, due to his declining health Mr. Dupree moved into his son’s home at 664 Lofton Lane and purchased a 90.63% interest in that home for $250,000. Mr. Dupree then changed his principal place of residence to 664 Lofton Lane prior to submitting his wife’s application for Medicaid. DFCS refused to acknowledge Mr. Dupree change of residence and found that 1 Bragg Circle was the home and Lofton Lane was non-homeplace property. Based on that determination, Petitioner was denied eligibility for being over resourced. As of the time of the hearing, the Bragg Circle property had been sold, and a new application was being processed with no determination having been issued. Reversing DFCS’s decision, the ALJ found that although “Petitioner does not have an ownership interest in the Lofton Lane property, her spouse, who is considered a deemor because his resources are deemed available to her, does have an interest in the property. Medicaid Manual 2502. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Lofton Lane property serves as Petitioner’s spouse’s principal place of residence. Therefore, the Lofton Lane property meets the requirements to be treated as homeplace property and the value of that interest should be excluded from the resource determination.”

  • On appeal, the ALJ’s decision in favor of Petitioner was affirmed although the language in the Commissioner’s decision states it was vacated as being moot. By the time the case was in front of the Commissioner, DFCS had processed the second application for Medicaid and had approved it, treating Lofton Lane as Mr. Dupree’s homeplace. The Commissioner found that DFCS’s action in processing the second application and treating Lofton lane as a homeplace property rendered the case moot.

Dupree v. Department. (June 2010).

Published by
David McGuffey

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